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Abstract: In safety critical applications it is important to detect faults that may compromise system safety and to take 
appropriate action. This paper discusses research carried-out on the development and validation of a model-based fault detection 
and isolation (FDI) system for a pneumatically actuated Stewart platform. The FDI scheme is based on combining parity-
equation and Kalman filter based techniques. The parity and Kalman filter equations are formulated and used to generate 
residuals that, in turn, are analysed to determine whether faults are present in the system.  Details of the design process are given 
and the experimental results are compared. The results demonstrate that both approaches when combined can successfully detect 
and isolate and in some cases accommodate faults associated with the sensors, actuators (servo-valves and piping) and the 
pneumatic system itself.   
Keywords: Fault detection; isolation; residuals; modelling; pneumatic; parity equation; Kalman filter; Stewart-Gough platform. 
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1.    INTRODUCTION 
A traditional approach to fault tolerance is based on 
hardware or physical redundancy methods to use multiple 
sensors, actuators, components to measure a particular 
variable. One of the major problems inherited with hardware 
redundancy includes the extra equipment and maintenance 
costs (Isermann, 1997). However, in certain safety critical 
applications physical redundancy can sometimes be the only 
method available. 
Model-based Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) uses the 
principles of analytical redundancy to first detect deviations 
from normal behaviour in a system, and then to isolate the 
particular component that has a fault. There are a number of 
approaches to model-based residual generation. Useful 
surveys of these and other useful FDI methods can be found 
in Patton (1997), Isermann (1984), Frank, (1990), Willsky 
(1976), and Venkatasubramaniam et al (2003). 
Fig.1 depicts a schematic structure of a typical FDI 
procedure using analytical redundancy described by Isermann, 
(1984). The analytical approach requires that a residual 
generator perform a validation of the nominal relationships of 
the system, using the actual input, u, and the measured output, 
y). Information from normal system operation (no faults, 
normal system behaviour) must be received, in order to act as 
a benchmark for comparison. 
 
 
Fig.1: Schematic structure of a FDI procedure using 
analytical redundancy. 
This is usually achieved by expressing the normal system 
operation in terms of system models. This modelling 
procedure is necessary to have relationships between various 
known or measured physical variables. Such system models 
can be represented in different formats (quantitative or 
qualitative). 
     This paper describes the design, development and 
validation of a fault tolerant control system on a Stewart-
Gough platform comprising six pneumatic actuators. The 
results show that the FDI scheme is found to detect and 
isolate pneumatic and sensor faults and in some cases an 
accommodation action is applied. As far as the authors are 
aware no such work has been carried out on a pneumatic 
system.  
 
2. EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP 
Stewart-Gough platforms are generally of a mechanical 
design used mainly for position control. The design is a 
parallel mechanism consisting of a rigid body mobile plate, 
connected to a fixed base plate and is defined by at least three 
stationary points on the fixed (grounded) base connected to 
six independent legs. The six legs are connected to both the 
base and top plate by universal/ball joints in parallel located 
at both ends of the six legs. The legs are designed with an 
upper body and lower body that can be adjusted. This allows 
for the length of each leg to be varied. The linear extension 
and retraction of the six cylinders gives the platform six 
degrees of freedom positioning capabilities. The aim is to 
control the pneumatic actuators (legs) using position control, 
with the platform position (6-degrees of freedom) achieved 
by a supervisory controller.  Figure 2 shows the Stewart-
Gough platform set-up. The design concept of the FDI 
scheme for the full Stewart-Gough platform is first designed 
using a single cylinder set-up. This modular approach is 
adopted so that a robust fault tolerant control scheme can be 
designed and validated off-line (i.e. not attached to the 
Stewart–Gough platform). This modular approach is made 
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possible as the Stewart-Gough platform design uses six 
identical pneumatic cylinders. The single actuator set-up is 
illustrated schematically in Fig.3. The flow from the air 
supply is governed by the servo valve which gives a flow into 
each of the cylinder chambers that is proportional to the 
voltage applied. This results in a differential pressure across 
the cylinder piston causing it to move. The pressures are 
measured via pressure sensors located between the valve and 
cylinder chambers (as close to the cylinder chambers as 
possible). The overall aim is position control, so this is 
measured via two Linear Resistive Transducers (LRT) 
mounted in the cylinder. The second position sensor provides 
a means of redundancy if the primary position develops a 
fault or fails. The schematic also shows the xPC Target 
coupled with Matlab/Simulink, which provides a real-time 
environment for running the control and fault detection 
algorithms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2. Stewart-Gough platform set-up 
 
 
Fig.3. Schematic of experimental set-up 
3. MODELLING PNEUMATIC SYSTEM 
The relationship between the air mass flow and the 
pressure changes in the chambers is obtained using energy 
conservation laws (first law of thermodynamics), and the 
force equilibrium is given by Newton’s second law. The 
pneumatic system can be approximated by equations (1-3), 
see for example Grewal et al (2008). Where Pp is the pressure 
in chamber p, Pn is the pressure in chamber n, Vp is the air 
volume in chamber p, Vn is the air volume in chamber in n, Ts 
is the operating temperature, γ is the ratio of specific heat, 
and R is the universal gas constant.  M is the piston mass, A is 
the bore area, x is the position of the piston, and Ff represents 
the viscous friction coefficient and coulomb friction force. K 
is the servo valve constant (kg.s
-1
.V
-1
) determined from the 
valve's data-sheet and v is the voltage input.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
                                                        (1) 
 
                                                        (2) 
 
                                                        (3)  
 
4. DESIGN OF FDI SCHEME 
Figure 1 shows the generic structure of the model-based 
fault detection scheme. The method consists of detecting 
faults on the process, which includes actuators, components 
and sensors, based on measuring the input signal U(t) and the 
output signal Y(t). The detection method uses models to 
generate residuals R(t). The residual evaluation examines the 
residuals for the likelihood of faults and a decision rule is 
applied to determine if faults have occurred. Referring to the 
pneumatic system depicted in Fig.3, the proportional valve 
would be described as the actuator and the pneumatic 
cylinder would be described as the plant. The sensors are 
self-evident. In this paper the process model can be based on 
either parity equations or Kalman filters. The main function 
of the FDI scheme is to detect faults such as position/pressure 
sensor faults, leaks in pneumatic system, blockages in 
pneumatic system and actuator faults. Once these faults are 
detected the FDI scheme isolates the fault. In isolating the 
fault, the fault can be classified as a particular fault. The two 
approaches taken here using the parity equation and Kalman 
filter technique are discussed, in turn, below. 
4.1 The Parity Equation Method 
 
The basic idea is to provide a proper check of the parity 
(consistency) of the measurements for the monitored system. 
The idea of the parity approach is to rearrange the model 
structure to achieve the best fault isolation (i.e. so that the 
effect of faults is far greater than that of the other 
uncertainties). The desired properties for the residual signal 
are R(t) ≠ 0 if  f(t) ≠ 0.Where R is the residual and f is the 
fault. The residual is generated based on the information 
provided by the system input and output signals and the plant 
equation. Fig.4 shows the pneumatic control loop scheme, 
which contains the following elements: The controller C(s), 
the proportional valve GA(s), the pneumatic actuator GP(s), 
and the sensor GS(s). The proportional valve fault Fa(s) and 
the sensor fault FS(s) can have dynamics, which are modelled 
by the transfer functions Ha(s), and HS(s). In addition to the 
position (feedback) sensor, pressure sensors are included in 
the system to read pressure from each chamber of the 
actuator. These are not included in the closed loop system, 
and are shown as Pp(s) and Pn(s) respectively. With the 
pressure sensor faults, shown as FPp(s) and FPn(s), again 
having dynamics modelled by the transfer functions HPp(s) 
and HPn(s). Using the description of the system shown in 
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Fig.4 the following relationships (equations) can be derived. 
(Grewal et al, 2009). 
 
XS(s)=[GS(s)+HS(s)FS(s)][GA(s)U(s) GP(s)+Ha(s)Fa(s)GA(s) 
GP(s)]                                                                                              (4)                                     
 
Pnact= [U(s)GA(s)+Ha(s)Fa(s)][Pn(s)+HPn(s)FPn(s)]                (5)                                                         
 
Ppact= [U(s)GA(s)+Ha(s)Fa(s)][Pp(s)+HPp(s)FPp(s)]                (6)                                                  
 
U(s)= C(s)(V(s)-XS(s))                                                   (7)                                                   
 
With the current experimental set-up the pneumatic plant 
output can only be measured with the position sensor. 
Therefore the actuator and plant faults cannot be isolated.  
Residuals are formulated from  (4) to (6) as follows 
 
R1=XS(s)-GS(s)GP(s)GA(s)U(s)=HS(s)FS(s)+Ha(s)Fa(s)           (8) 
                                           
R2= Pnact - U(s)GA(s)Pn(s)=Ha(s)Fa(s)+HPn(s)FPn(s)               (9)                                                   
 
R3= Ppact -U(s)GA(s)Pp(s)=Ha(s)Fa(s)+HPp(s)FPp(s)            (10)                                              
 
To represent the pneumatic process shown in Fig.4, GA(s) 
is modelled by the equations (1) and (2) and GP(s) by 
equation (3). It is assumed that the fault and sensor transfer 
functions are all instantaneous i.e. Ha(s), HS(s), HPn(s), 
HPp(s), Pn(s), Pp(s) and GS(s) =1. 
 
 
Fig.4. Pneumatic closed loop scheme with intended faults 
 
4.2. Observer approach (Kalman filter) 
 
The basic idea of the observer approach is to reconstruct 
the outputs of the system from the measurements or subsets 
of measurements with the aid of observers or Kalman filters 
using the estimation error or innovation (Frank, 1990). This 
estimation error or innovation is used as a residual for the 
detection and isolation of faults. For a linear system: 
 
GwBuAxx        (State equations)                           (11) 
y=Cx + Du + Hw + v   (Measurement equations)             (12)  
 
Where u is the input, w is the process noise, v is the 
measurement noise with E (ww
T
) =Q, and E (vv
T
) =R. It is 
also assumed that the state and measurement noise is 
uncorrelated, that is, E (wv
T
) = 0. An optimal estimate of y,
 
yˆ can be provided by the Kalman filter equations: 
                                                                                            (13) 
and  
(14) 
 
Where in practice the weightings for process and 
measurement noise (Q and R respectively) are chosen 
heuristically using engineering judgement to provide a trade-
off between sensitivity to faults, and the likelihood of false 
alarms. The steady-state Kalman filter gain L is determined 
by solving an algebraic Riccati equation. This estimator uses 
the known inputs u and the measurement y to generate the 
output and state estimates ŷ and .x

In order to make the 
system model equations observable, equations (1-3) have 
been manipulated to achieve system observability (15), the 
model has been reduced from a 4
th
 order to a 3
rd
 order 
equation.                                                                                   
 
 
                                 
(15) 
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In designing the Kalman filter approach only the sensed 
outputs are considered. These are position and pressure 
difference outputs. The residual equations are: 
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4.3.  Redundant sensor voting scheme 
The voter scheme is used to minimize switching 
transients since the isolation of faulty signals is achieved 
through a continuous numerical weighting (Broen, 1975). 
The voter scheme continuously determines the output in a 
manner which discriminates against the erroneous signal in 
favour of the other channels. The general form (Fig.5) of the 
voter scheme is determined using a weighted average of its 
inputs.  
 
 
Fig.5. General form of voting scheme 
Where Vout is defined as 
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The numerical properties of the voting scheme is given by 
letting 
                       𝑤𝑗 =
𝑤𝑗
𝑤1+𝑤2+𝑤3
,        𝑗 = 1, 2, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 3 
Where wj is given by 
                 𝑤1 =  1 +  
𝑥1−𝑥2
𝑎
 
2
 
𝑥1−𝑥2
𝑎
 
2
 
−1
                 (19) 
                 𝑤2 =  1 +  
𝑥2−𝑥1
𝑎
 
2
 
𝑥2−𝑥3
𝑎
 
2
 
−1
                 (20) 
                 𝑤3 =  1 +  
𝑥3−𝑥1
𝑎
 
2
 
𝑥3−𝑥2
𝑎
 
2
 
−1
                 (21) 
 
Where a is the tolerance parameter and is the measure of 
allowable noise level in a given channel and is hosen 
heuristically using engineering judgement. It should be noted 
as the above voting scheme deals with three sensor inputs. 
The Kalman filter estimate (x3) and the redundant signal (x2), 
the third signal is taken from the primary signal (x3). 
 
 
4.4. Residual Evaluation and Thresholds 
 
The purpose of residual evaluation is to generate a fault 
decision by processing the residuals. Residual evaluation is 
essentially to check if the residual is responding to a fault. 
The residual evaluation can in its simplest form be a 
threshold test applied to the residual, i.e. a fault is assumed 
present if | Ri(t) | > Ji(t) where Ji(t) is the threshold of the i
th 
residual. Another method may consist of statistical sequential 
probability ratio testing. In the present case the residuals are 
processed to acquire the root mean square (RMS) of the value 
over a moving window of N samples (Dixon, 2004) as 
shown:  
                                        
5,4,3,2,1
2
)( 
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i
N
ij
kR
k
Nkj
RMSi
R                                 (22)  
   
Where Ri(k) is the value of the i
th
 residual at the k
th
 
sample. Subsequently, the residual RMS value is compared 
with a predetermined fault detection threshold. Once a 
residual exceeds its respective threshold a fault flag is raised, 
the fault flag remains high as triggering is set so that once the 
threshold is exceeded the flag remains raised.  
Table 1 shows the theoretical fault signatures using the 
parity equations and Kalman filter approaches of the 
pneumatic system for various faults. These signatures arise 
from the formulation of parity equations and the structure of 
the observer scheme. Where the parity equations residuals 
(R1, R2 and R3), are given in (8), (9), and (10). The Kalman 
filter residuals (R4 and R5) are given by equations (15), (16), 
and (17). From (19), (20), and (21) further residuals can be 
generated. Basically, if no faults occur the weighted output is 
1 and if a fault occurs in either of the three signals (x1, x2 and 
x3) (𝑤 𝑗 )  →0. In order to comply with the Kalman and parity 
residuals the weighted average outputs are inverted (i.e. fault 
=1, and no fault = 0).  
 
Table 1:  Residual fault signatures 
 
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
In order to demonstrate the FDI scheme using parity 
equations and Kalman filter approaches a number of 
experiments were carried out on the Stewart–Gough platform 
(Fig.2). The faults presented are actuator faults including 
pressure leaks and pipe blockages and position/pressure 
sensor faults (signal loss and signal drift). These faults occur 
on just one pneumatic cylinder. The results for the other 
cylinders will of course be the same. The demand input to the 
system is a series of motions that represent the 6-degrees of 
movement, i.e. the longitudinal motions (surge), lateral 
(sway), and vertical (heave), and the angular motions 
expressed as Eulerian angle rotations with respect to the x-
axis (roll), y-axis (pitch), and z-axis (yaw). 
When a fault occurs, appropriate (safe) actions need to be 
taken. For the position sensor fault, accommodation is 
possible. This is also the case for the pressure sensor. For the 
other faults the appropriate action is to shutdown the rig. 
Actuator and leak faults are discussed in sections 5.1 and 5.2. 
These results are typical and the full set of results is 
summarised in Table 2.  
 
5.1   Actuator fault (control signal loss) 
 
A fault Fa(s) (see Fig.4) is applied to the proportional 
valve. The fault injected is that the control signal has been 
disconnected. This is physically achieved by means of a 
switch. Fig.6 shows the time histories of this experiment 
(actuator fault). 
 
5.1.1   Discussion - Actuator fault (control signal loss) 
Applying the disconnection fault to the control signal of 
the proportional valve has an effect on the parity residual 
(R1), this raises the fault flag. The fault has an effect on the 
pressure sensor parity residuals (R2 and R3). Both position 
and pressure difference Kalman residuals (R4 and R5) are 
affected by the actuator fault and their fault flags are raised. 
Residuals w1, w2 and w3 are not affected and the respective 
fault flags remain low. This agrees with the fault signatures 
detailed in Table 1. With this particular fault accommodation 
is not available as the control signal to the servo valve of 
pneumatic cylinder 2 is lost. This means that the desired 
positional movement of the rig is inadequate. From here 
(21.62s) the safety sequence is activated and the platform is 
made safe (i.e. brought back to its rest position). From both 
methods (Kalman and parity) the Kalman approach tracks the 
fault better and has a faster fault detection response time. 
 
Residual 
Potential faults 
Actuator Plant (x3) (x2) (x1) Pressure 
sensor (p) 
Pressure 
sensor (n) 
R1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
R2 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
R3 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
R4 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
R5 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
w1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
w2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
w3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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Overall, it is clear that the parity equations and the Kalman 
filter approaches can detect an actuator fault. However, 
neither method can isolate the fault in terms of discriminating 
between actuator and plant (cylinder) fault.  
Fig.6. Actuator fault Fa(s) (control signal loss) results 
 
 
5.2   Air leak (between servo valve and pneumatic cylinder) 
Air leaks may occur during normal operating conditions 
and can appear from any part of the pneumatic system. In this 
case the leak is injected between the servo valve and 
pneumatic cylinder at 18.6s. Figure 7 shows the time 
histories of this experiment (leak fault). 
 
5.2.1   Discussion - Air leak  
Applying the leak fault to the pneumatic cylinder has an 
effect on the parity residual R1, this raises the fault flag. The 
fault also has an affect on the pressure sensor parity residuals 
(R2 and R3). The fault affects the position residual R4 and the 
pressure difference residual R5. Residuals w1, w2 and w3 are 
not affected and the respective fault flags remain low. This 
agrees with the fault signatures detailed in Table 1. With this 
type of fault, accommodation is not available as pressure is 
lost between the servo valve and pneumatic cylinder. This 
means that the desired positional movement of the rig is not 
achievable. However, from the point where the fault is 
induced (18.6s) and the final residual (R1) is raised (23.98s) a 
certain amount of fault tolerance is available. Once the final 
residual fault flag is raised the safety sequence is activated 
and the platform is made safe (i.e. brought back to its rest 
position). Comparing RMS residuals R1 and R4 (position 
outputs), the Kalman filter approach when compared with the 
parity equation scheme has a faster fault detection response 
time. 
 
Fig.7. Air leak fault results 
 
5.3   Summary of fault detection results 
 
Table 2 shows a summary of the full set of the fault 
experiments carried out. In terms of comparison between the 
parity equations and the Kalman filter residuals outputs, the 
Kalman approach was found to be the more responsive in 
detecting faults. For the various faults applied Table 2 shows 
that the residual fault flags concur with the residual fault 
signatures detailed in Table 1.  Furthermore, the results show 
that when all five residuals R1, R2, R3, R4, and R5 are raised, 
the faults can be classified as a pneumatic fault or control 
signal. Whereas, in the case of the position sensor fault 
Residuals R1, R4 and 𝑤3 are raised. The pressure sensors 
faults can be identified as to which sensor is faulty by their 
respective residuals (i.e. residual’s R2 and R5 for pressure 
sensor p and residual’s R3 and R5 for pressure sensor n. 
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                                     CONCLUSIONS 
The paper has described the design, test and evaluation of 
fault detection in a closed loop system for a pneumatic 
Stewart-Gough platform. Parity equations and the Kalman 
filter approach have been used to generate residuals for the 
purpose of fault detection. Various fault scenarios have been 
considered, which are typical for a pneumatic operating 
system. These faults have been applied to the pneumatic 
system and the results show that using the described parity 
equation and Kalman filter methods; including the weighted 
average voting scheme (for position sensor faults) fault 
detection and isolation was possible from the available 
measurements. An important reason for selecting the parity 
equation approach is that it is a relatively simple design 
approach. Basic equations of the system are used directly and 
compared to the system. The Kalman filter approach is more 
complex as the scheme takes into account noise variances and 
requires tuning. The authors believe that applying the three 
schemes allows for enhanced fault detection and fault 
isolation.  
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Type of fault Fault time Residual type Fault flag  
raised 
Time fault  
Detected/isolated 
Action taken Fault type 
 
Time taken to 
 detect fault 
Position sensor 
fault 
 
42.69s 
Parity equation  R1  42.72s  
Fault accommodated 
 
Sensor 
 
0.3s Kalman filter R4  42.7s 
Weighted average w3 42.705s 
Pressure sensor 
(n) drift 
 
20s 
Parity equation R3  22.47s  
No action 
 
Sensor 
 
2.47s Kalman filter R5 22.2s 
 
 
Air blockage 
 
 
35s 
 R1  41.84s  
 
Safety mode activated 
 
 
Pneumatic  
 
 
6.84s 
Parity equation R2 41.8s 
 R3  41.8s 
Kalman filter R4  39.39s 
R5 38.64s 
 
 
Air leak 
 
 
 
18.6s 
 R1  23.98s  
 
Safety mode activated 
 
 
Pneumatic 
 
 
5.38s 
Parity equation  R2 18.67s 
 R3  18.5s 
Kalman filter R4  18.92s 
 R5 18.78s 
Pressure sensor 
 Signal loss (p) 
 
32.95s 
Parity equation  R2 33.2s  
No action  
 
Sensor 
 
0.25s Kalman filter R5 33.2s 
 
 
Actuator fault 
 
 
20s 
 
Parity equation 
 
R1  21.55s 
21.62s 
21.61s 
 
 
Safety mode activated 
 
 
Pneumatic 
 
 
1.62s 
R2 
R3 
Kalman filter R4 20.65s 
 R5 20.96s 
